Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 18th meeting*
Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 4 May 2018, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Bugajski ..... (Poland)

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* No summary records were issued for the 7th to 17th meetings.

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.4)

1. **The Chair** drew attention to the draft report of the Preparatory Committee on the work of its second session, which was contained in NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.4, and suggested that the Preparatory Committee should adopt it paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 5

2. *Paragraphs 1 to 5 were adopted.*

Paragraph 6

3. **The Chair** said that paragraph 6 would be amended to reflect the fact that 107 States parties had participated in the work of the second session of the Preparatory Committee: Côte d'Ivoire and Serbia should be included in the list.

4. *Paragraph 6, subject to the changes indicated, was adopted.*

Paragraph 7

5. **The Chair** said that after the conclusion of the session, the report would be amended to reflect the actual number of meetings held by the Committee and the meetings for which summary records would be provided.

6. *Paragraph 7 was adopted.*

Paragraphs 8 to 18

7. *Paragraphs 8 to 18 were adopted.*

Paragraph 19

8. **The Chair** said that the list of documents submitted during the second session of the Preparatory Committee, which was contained in paragraph 19, would be updated to include all documents submitted before the conclusion of the session.

9. *Paragraph 19, subject to the changes indicated, was adopted.*

Paragraph 20

10. **The Chair** said that the list of participants that was referred to in paragraph 20 would be modified as necessary to reflect any late submissions or corrections.

11. *Paragraph 20 was adopted.*

12. *The report of the Preparatory Committee as a whole, subject to the changes indicated, was adopted.*

Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3)

13. **The Chair** said that the draft of his factual summary had been circulated as conference room paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3. The final version would be issued as a working paper under his sole responsibility. In the summary, he had sought to objectively and accurately reflect the discussions that had taken place, including the useful ideas put forward as to how to increase the effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strengthen its implementation across all three of its pillars. Despite the deteriorating and increasingly complex security environment, those discussions had been both frank and constructive. He hoped that the summary would contribute to the successful conclusion of the current review cycle.

14. He had also submitted a document (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12) containing his reflections on the state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under his sole responsibility. Those reflections represented a continuation of the practice initiated by the Chair of the previous session, held in 2017, and built on that Chair's own reflections. He invited delegations to comment on that document also.

15. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) suggested that delegations should consider ways to reduce the huge responsibility placed on the Chair to summarize their discussions. The Chair's draft factual summary had taken a highly conservative and cautious approach to summarizing the discussions that had taken place relating to cluster 1 issues, notably the specific bloc of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances. That approach appeared to give disproportionate weight to the justifications given by nuclear-weapon States for their failure to implement their disarmament obligations under the Treaty and commitments made at the 2000 and 2010 review conferences. Paragraphs 20 to 24, for example, were dedicated to summarizing the positions of each nuclear-weapon State. The failure of the document to provide a balanced summary of the views that had been expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the non-compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their obligations and commitments was discriminatory. Furthermore, the draft undermined the integrity of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by highlighting

certain actions while disregarding others, including the unfulfilled disarmament commitments of nuclear-weapon States. The call made by many States parties on nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the commitment they had made in 2010 to accelerate progress on the thirteen steps was not reflected in the draft summary. Moreover, there was no reference to the fact that many States parties had expressed concern at the failure to implement the obligation, under article VI of the Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and had called for the immediate commencement of such negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament. The concern expressed by numerous States parties regarding the existence of programmes to develop new types of nuclear weapons in violation of the Treaty, and their calls for the cessation of such programmes, had also been excluded from the summary. Many States parties had recalled the undertaking of all nuclear-weapon States under the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and had urged them to fulfil that commitment, but that was not reflected in a factual manner. Furthermore, the Chair's summary had disregarded the positions and proposals of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, which was the largest regional grouping.

16. With regard to cluster 2 issues, namely, non-proliferation, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones, the summary did not reflect the discussions that had taken place, and the relevant sections appeared to have been drafted by the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There was no reference to the concern expressed by many delegations regarding "nuclear sharing" arrangements, which were a violation of non-proliferation obligations under article I of the Treaty. Furthermore, the first sentence of paragraph 52, regarding the provisional application of additional protocols, did not reflect the consensus view of States parties; opinions on that issue diverged. Representatives of many States, including members of the Non-Aligned Movement, had emphasized the importance of the accession by Israel to the Treaty and the placement of its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, that was not reflected in the Chair's summary.

17. **Mr. Valero** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), speaking on behalf of the Group of States parties belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that at the eighteenth session of the Mid-Term Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held one month earlier, ministers had reaffirmed the Group's principled positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. They had also expressed their concern about the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. The Group attached great importance to the success of the review process and to its role in strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty's pillars in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner in order to advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

18. The Group had participated in the current session constructively, submitting nine working papers and delivering a series of joint statements that reflected the Group's positions on various issues. As the largest regional group, those positions should be reflected in the Chair's factual summary in a comprehensive, factual and balanced manner. However, the Group was concerned that that was not the case. It was also concerned by the summary's failure to address thoroughly the unbalanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars, particularly the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament compared to non-proliferation.

19. During the discussion on cluster 1 issues, many States parties had stressed the urgent need for nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and implement the steps agreed on in the final documents of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences. However, that sense of urgency was not reflected in the Chair's factual summary. The resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constituted a binding commitment that must be addressed by review conferences until it was implemented. The Group firmly rejected any suggestion that review conferences were not the appropriate forums in which to address the issue.

20. **Ms. Higgie** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said it was important that the Chair's factual summary should fully reflect the range of views that had been expressed at the current session. In that respect, she noted with concern the emphasis in paragraph 7 on the need to "safeguard gains" made under the Treaty, inter alia, on disarmament. That emphasis might suggest that the primary focus of States parties was to safeguard progress already made. However, the overwhelming majority of those States felt that the gains made under that pillar had been insufficient, and it was that lack of progress that must be addressed urgently. Paragraph 7 also mentioned the need to identify areas of common ground before pathways for the further implementation of the Treaty could be pursued; in fact, those pathways had already been established and agreed on by all at the 1995, 2000

and 2010 review conferences. Paragraph 8 referred to the need to "create the conditions conducive to further nuclear disarmament". Since that was an area of considerable contention among States parties, reference should also have been made to the fact that that view was not shared by a number of States parties.

21. It was regrettable that paragraph 12 stated that the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States was to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals, "taking into account the special responsibility of States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals", whereas the unequivocal undertaking made by those States in 2000 and reaffirmed in 2010 was "to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under article VI".

22. In the second sentence of paragraph 19, the placement of the word "some" suggested that some nuclear weapon modernization programmes were consistent with the Treaty's object and purpose, and with commitments made under the Treaty. That view was contested by many States parties. The language in paragraph 29 regarding the operational status of nuclear weapons systems was unacceptably weak. The suggestion that nuclear-weapon States were called upon to further reduce alert levels "where possible" did not reflect the strong calls by States parties regarding the de-alerting of nuclear weapons.

23. It was regrettable that none of the four paragraphs that dealt with nuclear testing and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mentioned the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions pending that Treaty's entry into force. Furthermore, the Coalition was gravely concerned by the lack of balance in the references to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. While paragraph 41 of the summary noted that some States parties had expressed their opposition to the Treaty, paragraph 40 did not mention the support expressed by many States parties; indeed, it did not refer to support for the Treaty at all. Instead, it simply noted that the Treaty had been concluded, and that a number of States parties had provided information about its ratification process and status. Moreover, the statement in the final sentence of paragraph 40 that the Treaty "was designed to" strengthen existing disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes was unacceptable, since many States parties had noted that the Treaty would strengthen those regimes. The Coalition intended to submit its comments in the form of a working paper.

24. **Ms. Mxakato-Diseko** (South Africa) said that her country welcomed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a positive step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the current session, States parties had reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The overwhelming majority had expressed concerns about the threat of nuclear war owing to escalating rivalry between the nuclear powers. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against their use. Her country was concerned about the continuing modernization of nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems, as well as the salience of nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States, which violated the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

25. There were numerous instances in the Chair's factual summary of certain views having been "welcomed". That created the impression that those views had received widespread support, which in some cases could not be further from the truth. Meanwhile, other issues that had been widely supported did not receive similar coverage. That inconsistent treatment was exemplified by the references to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Although that Treaty represented one of the most important developments in the area of nuclear weapons since 1945, filled a significant gap in international law and had been welcomed by the overwhelmingly majority of States parties and groups, paragraph 40 stated only that its conclusion had been "noted". In contrast, paragraph 41 clearly reflected the fact that some States parties opposed the Treaty. The topic was therefore treated in an unbalanced and partial manner.

26. A small number of States parties had described the international security environment as deteriorating, and had voiced the opinion that conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament must be established. That view appeared to have created the narrative in the summary that States parties must improve the geopolitical environment in order to create the conditions necessary for further disarmament. However, article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty contained no such provisions. South Africa was concerned by that attempt by nuclear-weapon States to distort and undermine the Treaty's letter and spirit; the Chair should not have reflected it as a majority view. There was no better time than now for nuclear-weapon States to comply unconditionally with their commitments and obligations, particularly those relating to disarmament. It would therefore have been more accurate to begin paragraph 8 with the words of the final sentence of that paragraph, namely, "commitments made under the Treaty were not subject

to conditions and should be implemented without delay", which did reflect the majority view.

27. States parties had clearly expressed their concern regarding the growing role of nuclear weapons in military and strategic doctrines and the modernization programmes of nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, the use in the summary of wording such as "perceived" and "potentially" and the reference to nuclear weapons' playing a "diminished" role, in an effort to downplay that danger and justify the continued possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, was inappropriate.

28. Nuclear security must be positioned within the broader framework of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efforts to strengthen nuclear security must not hamper international cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear activities.

29. South Africa shared the view expressed by many States of the importance of full adherence by all parties to the joint comprehensive plan of action, and called on all relevant parties to continue fulfilling their obligations under the agreement.

30. **Mr. Yermakov** (Russian Federation), drawing attention to the joint statement (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/7/Rev.1) submitted by his country and China regarding the joint comprehensive plan of action, said that that statement reflected the opinion of the vast majority of States parties, which had expressed full support for the deal, and contained only elements that had already been agreed upon by all those States.

31. The Chair's factual summary reflected the views that had been expressed at the current session as accurately and comprehensively as possible. Most importantly, it reflected the fact that States parties had reaffirmed their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of international security. It was appropriate that the summary focused exclusively on issues related directly to the Treaty. Indeed, the success of the 2020 Review Conference depended on how substantively and constructively States parties approached discussions on existing problems. It was important to refrain from politicizing their discussions. It was regrettable that States parties continued to disagree on how to make progress on nuclear disarmament. The international community's efforts should focus on laying the foundations for further steps in that area. Given the current environment, it was important to make systematic and collective efforts to ensure international security and stability, restore confidence and create consensus. He hoped that the functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency, while a sensitive topic, would be addressed more scrupulously in the future. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must continue to be addressed during the review cycle. The convening of a conference on that topic remained relevant and was a feasible task in the context of implementation of the 1995 resolution. A decision must be taken in that respect at the 2020 Review Conference. The working paper submitted by the Russian Federation at the Preparatory Committee's previous session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.31) could serve as a basis for such a decision.

32. **Mr. Ouadah** (Algeria) said that the Chair's factual summary could have been more balanced and comprehensive, particularly with regard to its coverage of States parties' discussions on nuclear disarmament and the implementation of the 1995 resolution.

33. **Mr. Fu** Cong (China) said that the joint statement submitted by his country and the Russian Federation expressed the two States' support for the joint comprehensive plan of action, which reflected the shared aspirations of the vast majority of States. The plan represented a significant achievement in international non-proliferation efforts and must be complied with by all relevant parties. Those parties must proceed with long-term interests in mind and firm political will to continue to implement the deal in full.

34. The Chair's factual summary essentially reflected the discussions that had taken place at the current session. Nevertheless, its extensive use of the words "States parties" gave the incorrect impression that much of the content reflected the common understanding of all States parties. Furthermore, issues raised by many States parties were not adequately reflected, such as the need to respect existing disarmament mechanisms and take a progressive approach to nuclear disarmament, and the calls for States to abandon the nuclear umbrella and, where applicable, withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Moreover, the summary did not reflect in a comprehensive or balanced manner the positions of all States parties regarding the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. That moratorium was impossible to verify, and its definition and scope were unclear. Thus, it had limited significance and weakened the international community's political will to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. China would support efforts by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations regarding such a treaty as soon as possible.

35. **Mr. Al Ashkar** (Syrian Arab Republic) noted the politicized nature of paragraphs 82 to 87 of the Chair's

factual summary, which dealt with the 1995 resolution. There was no reference to the view expressed by many States parties that the failure to implement the resolution was a result of the growing nuclear capabilities of Israel and its refusal to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, thus threatening peace and security in the Middle East.

36. The summary demonstrated a discriminatory attitude towards Syria. Paragraph 89 did not reflect the reality regarding cooperation between his country and IAEA. The issue of the implementation by his country of its comprehensive safeguards agreement had been on the agenda of the Agency's Board of Governors since Israel had attacked a military facility in Dayr al-Zawr. At the time, the Director General of IAEA had stated that that unilateral use of force had hindered the Agency in discharging its responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in respect of the safeguards agreement with Syria. Therefore, the comments made by some States parties regarding the implementation by Syria of the agreement in fact related to that attack by Israel and that country's lack of cooperation with the Agency in relation to the nature of the missiles it had used. Following the belated acknowledgment by Israel of its responsibility for the attack, the pretext of denial no longer existed. The States that had raised allegations regarding the refusal by his country to cooperate with IAEA must condemn Israeli aggression and compel Israel to cooperate with the Agency to clarify the source of contamination at that facility. Syria had responded positively to calls to cooperate with IAEA to close the debate on the issue of safeguards implementation and remove it from the agenda of the Agency's Board of Governors. In October 2011, Syria had agreed a workplan with IAEA to settle all pending issues in that regard. However, the States parties that had raised allegations regarding his country's implementation of safeguards were the same States parties that had obstructed the implementation of that workplan for well-known political reasons. Syria was committed to continuing to implement the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded in 1992 with IAEA to facilitate the visit of inspectors. Contrary to the claims made in the draft factual summary, that cooperation was evidenced by the Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report for 2017.

37. **Mr. Youssef** (Egypt) said that the Chair's factual summary did not reflect the overwhelming disappointment expressed by States parties at the lack of progress made by nuclear-weapon States in implementing article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, focusing instead on other conceptual issues related to nuclear disarmament. It was not clear why the views of only certain States parties had been outlined with regard to disarmament.

38. His country was surprised to note the absence, in the paragraphs that dealt with the Middle East, of any reference to the urgent need for Israel to adhere to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, subject all its nuclear facilities to comprehensive safeguards and comply with relevant Security Council resolutions. Despite repeated references to that topic in both national and group statements delivered in relation to specific issues under cluster 2, the summary contained only a modest reference to universal adherence to the Treaty in paragraph 6. In view of the considerable attention given to the case of Israel in the discussions, that case warranted more extensive coverage, especially since the summary made reference to other cases relating to specific countries.

39. It was regrettable that the paragraph 84 of the draft summary noted merely that the achievement of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction "remained a priority for many States", since Egypt had always assumed that that step was a priority, even a binding commitment, for all States parties. Moreover, the reference in paragraph 86 to conditions conducive to the establishment of such a zone represented a dangerous concept, essentially encouraging States of the region to pursue, from each country's narrow national perspective, policies that were contrary to the Treaty's principles and objectives and their related commitments.

40. Unfortunately, the summary overlooked the criticism levelled by many delegations at States that engaged in nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty, despite the grave implications that such conduct had on the credibility and sustainability of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in general. That important issue should not have been neglected. His country firmly rejected any mischaracterization of additional protocols as the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty, which clearly established that comprehensive safeguards agreements were the only such standard. Lastly, in respect of document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12, States parties should evaluate the usefulness of the new practice whereby the Chairs of Preparatory Committee sessions submitted their own reflections, before a precedent was set.

41. **Ms. Guitton** (France) said that the Chair's factual summary reflected areas of common ground and disagreement as comprehensively as possible. Unfortunately, the text contained information contrary to the views and concerns expressed by France,

particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. Her country fully complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was more important than ever to pursue constructive dialogue on issues over which disagreement persisted in order to identify common approaches that enabled balanced progress to be made in fully implementing the Treaty. The efforts of all States parties had resulted in a constructive atmosphere and positive discussions. France remained committed to the collective responsibility of all States parties to upholding and strengthening the three pillars of the Treaty.

42. **Mr. Gaffey** (Ireland) said that while producing a summary of the complex discussions that had taken place was a challenging task, it was regrettable that the summary did not reflect in a more balanced and positive manner the views expressed in relation to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which most States parties had welcomed. He appreciated the inclusion of the view expressed by his delegation and the delegations of many other States parties that it was fundamentally important to promote the equal participation and leadership of women and men in the areas of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, it was regrettable that no reference was made to the disproportionate impact of exposure to ionizing radiation on women and girls, especially since that issue had been included in the factual summary of the Chair of the previous Preparatory Committee session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40).

43. **Mr. Al Kaabi** (United Arab Emirates), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, reaffirmed that review conferences were the main forum for review of the implementation of the 1995 resolution, particularly with respect to the commencement of negotiations on convening a conference for negotiating a binding instrument on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, without any preconditions. He highlighted the special responsibility of the three States that had sponsored the resolution in that regard. The implementation of the resolution was a priority and a commitment that all States parties had agreed on. All Arab States had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. Israel was the only State in the region that had not done so, and as such, it was violating the relevant international resolutions. Most States parties had called on Israel to accede to the Treaty and submit all its nuclear facilities to the Agency's safeguards system without delay. The Arab group would continue to engage constructively with all parties in seeking the balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty's three pillars.

44. **Ms. Whyte Gómez** (Costa Rica) said that many aspects of the discussions that had taken place at the current session were not factually reflected in the Chair's summary. Paragraph 16 referred to the acknowledgement by many States parties of the significant reductions made by nuclear-weapon States in their nuclear arsenals. However, the prevailing view that had been expressed was one of concern at the number of deployable weapons that continued to exist, nuclear weapon modernization programmes and the increase in nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the vast majority of States parties had stressed the urgent need for progress on nuclear disarmament, and for nuclear-weapon States to comply with their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the final documents of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences. Those positions were not appropriately reflected in the summary. It was also discouraging that the summary only briefly addressed the use of nuclear deterrence in the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States and their allies, which had been discussed at length. The importance of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in strengthening article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as expressed by many States parties, was minimized in the summary. The support of those States for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was based on the proven humanitarian consequences of the use of such weapons and the fact that such weapons undermined the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and international peace and security.

45. States parties must be innovative in positioning the Non-Proliferation Treaty among the new generation of legal instruments relating to disarmament and non-proliferation, break the stalemate surrounding the Treaty and revitalize its credibility by ensuring that all States parties complied with all their obligations. After fifty years, working methods had stagnated and must be adapted to the new dynamics of multilateralism. Those methods might include the use of panels or thematic discussions and the interactive participation of civil society, including academia and scientific experts, which had proved effective in other cases. The increased involvement of women and young people in disarmament processes was also necessary, as was improved education and cooperation in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A stronger connection must be forged between preparatory committee and review conference processes, and the Treaty must be evaluated on the basis of progress made with respect to its three pillars and compliance by States parties with

their obligations. A stronger culture of compliance must be fostered with a view to achieving the Treaty's objectives. States parties could not continue to discuss the same issues every year as if they were doing so for the first time, with no accountability for their failure to comply with the Treaty and the commitments they had undertaken in the context of review conferences. It was vital that the 2020 Review Conference should be a success.

46. **Ms. Arredondo Picó** (Cuba) said that the Chair's factual summary reflected almost all the elements that had been discussed during the current session. However, her country was concerned that certain issues had not been addressed factually. For example, the text did not accurately reflect the balance of views expressed by delegations in respect of nuclear disarmament, or the urgency with which nuclear-weapon States must comply with their obligations and commitments under article VI and those undertaken at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences. In general, nuclear-weapon States had attempted to use the security environment as a precondition for fulfilling those obligations and commitments, as reflected in paragraph 8. However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty established no such precondition. Cuba rejected any attempt to establish conditions or additional measures in an attempt to justify the delay in achieving disarmament. Furthermore, greater weight was given to the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament (paragraphs 20 to 24), than to the concerns voiced by non-nuclear-weapon States at the lack of progress in that area.

47. The treatment in paragraph 40 of the discussion that had taken place regarding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was insufficient given that most States parties had shared the view that the Treaty was the most significant achievement in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in more than two decades, and was fully compatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The summary should state that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instrument that was in line with the legal obligations of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was concerning that the opposite view was given greater coverage and was expressed in stronger terms in paragraph 41. In that respect, the wording "was noted" in paragraph 40, with reference to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, should be replaced with the words "was welcomed".

48. Cuba was also concerned by the implicit renewed confidence of nuclear-weapon States in nuclear weapons and deterrence doctrines. The reference made in paragraph 19 to that issue did not reflect the extent of the concerns that had been expressed by numerous delegations. With regard to paragraph 1, the language of the previous summary (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40) more accurately reflected States parties' views on the role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in relation to international peace and security. In paragraph 4, the word "historic" in "historic achievements of the NPT" was unnecessary, as it was the only time it was used in the text, despite the fact that the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had also been regarded by many delegations as a historic achievement. In paragraph 15, the wording "in accordance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty" would have been more appropriate than "in accordance with their relevant multilateral obligations". In respect of paragraph 16, it would have been more accurate to state that nuclear-weapon States had been urged to reduce their nuclear arsenals with a view to achieving total elimination, rather than "All nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from increasing the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals". In many paragraphs, the expression "States parties" was not appropriate, since it was used as if the text had been negotiated and agreed on by all participating States, or as if all delegations present had expressed their opinion on the topic. In paragraph 53, it was inaccurate to claim that States parties had noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, represented the current verification standard. Only a number of States had made that claim, which contradicted the language contained in relevant IAEA resolutions.

49. **Ms. Drury** (Australia) said that her delegation had taken note of the Chair's separate document (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12) containing reflections on the state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which her country would examine closely after the current session. The key message of the session was that the Treaty was strong, effective and essential for global security. All States parties had an interest in finding common ground to implement and strengthen its three pillars.

50. The Chair's factual summary reflected not only significant differences of opinion on a range of issues, but also areas of convergence. Australia welcomed the reference in the text to the fact that the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented a serious challenge to the Treaty and to global and regional security. It was vital that the Preparatory Committee should make clear States parties' expectations of that country with respect to the Treaty and the importance of maintaining pressure and implementing existing

sanctions. Australia also welcomed the reference to a progressive and pragmatic approach to disarmament, and the inclusion of many practical examples, including confidence-building, risk reduction, a fissile material cut-off treaty, transparency, reporting and the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The summary should have mentioned the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of that Treaty.

51. The summary reflected the fact that sustainable disarmament efforts must be inclusive and take into account the security environment. Her country welcomed the language endorsing gender parity in participation and leadership across all three Treaty pillars, and looked forward to building on the important work on gender, diversity and inclusion during the current review cycle. Australia also commended the practical suggestions for further work to improve transparency and the proposal to hold dedicated interactive sessions to discuss national reports. The meeting on strengthening the review process had been one of the most interactive, and Australia was pleased to see that several practical proposals had been reflected in the summary, such as the proposal to establish a dedicated working group.

52. **Mr. Heredia Acosta** (Mexico) said that, while he understood the difficulty of reflecting all aspects of the discussions that had taken place during the current session in a summary, the way that those discussions were presented created confusion and did not accurately reflect the full range of positions expressed. In some cases, views were presented in a way that suggested that they were the consensus opinion, when opposition to those views had also been expressed. In other cases, the overwhelming support that certain proposals had received was not reflected. Thus, the summary was neither complete nor objective.

53. **Mr. Kuatbekov** (Kazakhstan) affirmed his country's support for the joint statement (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/7/Rev.1) submitted by China and the Russian Federation regarding the joint comprehensive plan of action. The large majority of delegations appeared to support the substance of that statement. The joint comprehensive plan of action demonstrated the possibility of successful international diplomacy in the area of non-proliferation, and, as the best available mechanism for demonstrating the commitment of the Islamic Republic of Iran to conducting a peaceful nuclear programme, must be upheld in the absence of a valid alternative.

54. **Mr. Ambrazevich** (Belarus) said that his country scrupulously complied with its commitments under the Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement, had voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and had established a transparent and constructive relationship with IAEA with regard to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, Belarus remained committed to article VI of the Treaty and believed that measures such as the entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the development of a legally binding instrument on the production of fissile material and the development of a legally binding agreement to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with unequivocal and unconditional negative security assurances were in line with commitments on effective measures to prevent a nuclear arms race and the subsequent renunciation of nuclear weapons.

55. His country welcomed the results of the inter-Korean summit and supported the goal, as established by the relevant parties, of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The international community must support those efforts. It was also necessary to maintain existing agreements aimed at non-proliferation. In that regard, the joint comprehensive plan of action must remain in force. Any revisions of the deal at the current stage could send a negative signal to parties to other negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Belarus supported the joint statement on that issue submitted by China and the Russian Federation (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/7/Rev.1).

56. **Ms. Moraga** (Chile) said that the vast majority of States parties had reaffirmed their political will to make progress with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's three pillars. The Treaty had prevented greater nuclear proliferation. Chile had supported those efforts and valued the progress made in harnessing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which contributed to national development and citizens' well-being.

57. However, her country shared with the majority of delegations the sense of frustration and concern regarding the failure to implement article VI of the Treaty and the resulting lack of progress on disarmament obligations. The asymmetric nature of the Treaty, under which certain States reserved the right to maintain nuclear arsenals while the rest had pledged to renounce them, had been accepted by States parties on the basis that it was not a permanent solution or a means of legitimizing those weapons. On the contrary, although the Treaty did not set out a time frame, it established a clear legal obligation for nuclear-weapon States under article VI. In that respect, the summary must not only refer to the importance that delegations attached to that article, but must also emphasize that the majority had also expressed concern regarding the lack of progress in its implementation. Her country had noted

the progress made on disarmament by the permanent members of the Security Council, which received individual attention in the Chair's summary. However, those efforts must be accompanied by a reduction in those States' military spending, the downscaling of their nuclear weapon modernization programmes and a reduction in the operational status of their nuclear weapons.

58. Like other States parties, Chile supported the strengthening of the Treaty and was concerned that its selective implementation would affect its credibility. The current global polarization and the determination of nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear deterrence doctrines constituted serious threats to the integrity of the Treaty and the international legal regime. The existence of nuclear weapons also posed a threat to human survival, because nuclear deterrence served only to create an international environment based on fear and a false sense of security. "Nuclear peace" was a myth, and was used as a threat against non-nuclear-weapon States.

59. The concerns shared by the overwhelming majority of States, particularly regarding the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, had resulted in the negotiation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Chile had participated in that process and welcomed the reference made in paragraph 40 of the Chair's factual summary to that Treaty and its complementarity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, it was vital to highlight that the adoption of the Treaty was owed to the support of more than 100 States that had wished to establish concrete steps towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Her country was concerned that the current drafting of paragraph 41 created the incorrect impression that the number of delegations that had expressed opposition to that Treaty was roughly equal to the number of delegations that had expressed their support for the instrument. However, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had been supported and defended by the large majority of States, while only a small number of nuclear-weapon States and their strategic partners had criticized it. Although it was important to include both viewpoints in the summary, the magnitude of the support expressed for each position must be reflected in a reliable and objective manner.

60. She highlighted the reference to the urgent need to bring the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force as a key element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the call on those States that had not yet signed or ratified it to do so. Chile welcomed the fact that the summary reflected the concerns of numerous delegations with regard to actions that undermined the spirit of that Treaty. All States must refrain from conducting any tests aimed at developing nuclear weapons. In that respect, Chile welcomed the recent announcements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regarding nuclear disarmament, and urged that country to turn its words into actions by taking tangible steps to regain the trust of the international community, including by returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, implementing IAEA safeguards and relevant Security Council resolutions and acceding to the Test-Ban Treaty.

61. Paragraphs 81 to 87 accurately reflected the discussions that had taken place, including the frustration felt by a large majority of States parties at the failure to implement the 1995 resolution and to convene a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Her country, which was located in one of the first such zones to have been established, had always supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an intermediate step towards a world without nuclear weapons, and would continue to support the process in the Middle East, which was vital to ensure peace and strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

62. With regard to the strengthening of the review process, her country supported the adoption of measures to improve the planning and efficiency of delegations' work. In that respect, she drew attention to the proposals included in working document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26 submitted by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Time was of the essence. In order to harness the political will of the current session and achieve a successful outcome to the 2020 Review Conference, it was vital to nominate the members of the bureau of that Conference. She hoped that Mr. Grossi of Argentina would be nominated as President of the Conference, as she was certain that he would navigate them calmly and surely through the difficult discussions that lay ahead.

63. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that delegations had engaged in substantive and lively debates on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was so central to collective security interests that it was universally described as the cornerstone of the international arms control and disarmament architecture. The Chair's factual summary provided a sound basis for delegations' future work. Although the starting point for their discussions had been the general feeling that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had served and would continue to serve them well, they could not deny the challenges that the non-proliferation regime was facing. The illegal

quest for nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained the biggest proliferation crisis to date and a huge threat to international peace and security. While his country welcomed the recent diplomatic initiatives aimed at decreasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it was vital to remain vigilant, as that country had yet to take concrete action to renounce its nuclear and ballistic missile programme in a complete, irreversible and verifiable manner. States parties must stand united in order to counter the challenges that the country's illegal activities posed to the Treaty. He welcomed the fact that so many States had endorsed the statement contained in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/9, which reiterated the expectations of the international community in that regard.

64. His country was firmly committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the joint comprehensive plan of action by all relevant parties. That landmark agreement demonstrated that it was possible to reach a comprehensive solution to major nuclear proliferation crises. It was important to address prudently the challenges facing the deal, which had many ramifications for the security of the Middle East and the future of the Treaty. Delegations had also alluded to the dangers of proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the need to preserve and strengthen the relevant international legal framework. That was important, as the undermining of any universally accepted norm represented a challenge to the rules-based international order.

65. Germany had voiced its concern regarding the violation of existing arms control agreements, notably the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), and had called on the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). His country had also reaffirmed its position with regard to efforts to reinterpret the compatibility of "nuclear sharing" with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

66. The current session had vividly demonstrated the complex global security situation and the resulting threats to non-proliferation. Nevertheless, Germany would continue to pursue an ambitious nuclear disarmament agenda, being convinced that not only defence and deterrence, but also disarmament and arms control, contributed to security. An inclusive, step-by-step approach, rather than a radical but unrealistic one, was the best way to achieve that goal. In that context, an instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would be a major breakthrough that would strengthen non-proliferation efforts and contribute to nuclear disarmament. His country was pleased to note that support for such an instrument remained strong. Germany valued the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the International Monitoring System, and wished to see the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enter into force. Given the almost universal support for that important instrument, it would surely do so in the not-too-distant future.

67. A robust and credible verification regime involving concrete disarmament measures was needed. There was growing proof that initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification could deliver tangible results through a non-discriminatory and technical approach. Negative security assurances had also played an important role in establishing confidence in the non-proliferation regime and diminishing the prominence of nuclear weapons in national military doctrines. The reaffirmation of existing negative security assurances was one possible outcome of the 2020 Review Conference. Germany remained committed to promoting those and other concrete steps to advance the implementation of all three Treaty pillars.

68. Over the past two weeks, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative had held fruitful and focused discussions with the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition regarding concrete proposals that had been put forward by the Initiative in relation to transparency and reform of the review process. The Initiative's active engagement underlined its key role in ensuring cohesion within the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, despite States parties' differing approaches to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

69. His country once again commended IAEA for its invaluable work relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including through its safeguards system. Nuclear security was a global challenge given that the threat of nuclear terrorism had reached global dimensions. Germany would continue to monitor all processes aimed at strengthening the framework of the relevant international bodies, with IAEA in a central coordinating role.

70. **Mr. Kitano** (Japan) said that the Chair's factual summary was balanced and reflected the discussions that had taken place. His country would appreciate the

inclusion of more specific details, in paragraph 45, with regard to the three key measures proposed by the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, namely, the need for transparency, an effective disarmament verification mechanism and interactive discussions to address "hard questions". Japan would continue to support and facilitate those discussions while welcoming creative inputs from all stakeholders. He agreed with most of the content of paragraphs 90 to 92. In that context, Japan commended the efforts of the Republic of Korea in holding an inter-Korean summit. The outcome represented a positive step towards resolving outstanding issues. He hoped that, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would take concrete action to dismantle all its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. He appreciated the reference in paragraph 114 to the proposal of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to discuss reporting practices in order to improve the review process. Japan valued the role played by civil society in that process, and attached great importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education.

71. **Ms. Majali** (Jordan) reiterated the importance of establishing concrete and urgent measures at the current session and at the 2020 Review Conference to ensure fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by States parties, particularly in relation to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. She also reiterated that Israel must accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State without further delay, place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and conduct its nuclear activities in accordance with the Treaty. Those steps were essential for the Treaty's credibility. She had hoped that the positions expressed by her delegation and those of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which represented the views of the majority of States parties, would be duly reflected in the Chair's factual summary. The implementation of the 1995 resolution was a priority not only in terms of the credibility of review process outcomes and the Treaty but also in ensuring the future security, peace and stability of the region.

72. **Mr. Mundaca Peñaranda** (Philippines) said that while he understood the challenges of including the diverse positions expressed by States parties in the Chair's factual summary in a balanced and comprehensive manner, greater emphasis should have been given to the views of the Non-Aligned Movement, which reflected the sentiments expressed by many delegations. He also noted the understated reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, its significance and the support for it voiced by many States parties. Nevertheless, the summary would be a useful tool for reflecting on the complex elements of the Preparatory Committee's work and would motivate the States parties to make further progress.

73. **Mr. Saleh** (Iraq) said that all States that had acceded to the Treaty had intended to rid the world of nuclear weapons. However, fifty years after the Treaty's entry into force, States parties had not made equal efforts to implement its provisions or the outcomes of review conferences.

74. He had hoped that the entire content of the discussions that had taken place would be reflected in the Chair's summary, in a factual manner. However, some of the views expressed by the Arab Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and others were not reflected. It was regrettable that there was no reference to the international community's consensus on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a key step towards universal implementation of the Treaty, or the position of most States parties regarding the need to implement the 1995 resolution. Review conferences should be the main forum for the review of implementation of that resolution, and the three sponsoring States should bear special responsibility in that regard.

75. **Mr. Aguiar Patriota** (Brazil) said that the Chair's summary was not sufficiently factual. Brazil opposed the use of "States parties" in the text if such use was intended to indicate areas of agreement or consensus.

76. The references to "stability" in paragraph 1 and other paragraphs were unacceptable, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not establish stability as a condition for the implementation of the obligations it set out. The idea of a "recommitment conference" in paragraph 5 required further discussion. There was an urgent need for disarmament, rather than to "safeguard gains made in disarmament", as indicated in paragraph 7.

77. Paragraph 6 should refer, as the factual summary of the Chair of the previous session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40) had done, to the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) with respect to the need for nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the Treaty to bring into force safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

78. The suggestion in paragraph 8 that certain conditions must be created in order for further progress on nuclear disarmament to be made was not a Treaty-backed concept but at most a minority view. It should therefore be removed. The reference in paragraph 12 to the elimination of nuclear arsenals did not fully reflect nuclear-weapon States' disarmament obligations under the Treaty. The concept of disarmament per se must be adhered to. It should not be the prerogative of nuclear-weapon States to nominally register their opposition to specific issues, as seen in paragraph 14, particularly since opposition expressed by other States parties to other issues was not reflected elsewhere in the text. The view expressed by nuclear-weapon States in paragraph 19 regarding the continued role of credible nuclear deterrence was neither backed by the Treaty nor supported by the majority of States parties.

79. Furthermore, several delegations had referred to the emergence of a new qualitative nuclear arms race, which threatened the Treaty regime with respect to both disarmament and non-proliferation. Therefore, the reference in paragraph 19 to only "some" modernization programmes being inconsistent with the Treaty was insufficient: all modernization programmes were contrary to the Treaty's purpose and objectives. That trend was compounded by the persistent failure to implement article VI and related commitments agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences, which had been mentioned by many delegations but was not explicitly reflected in the Chair's summary. Brazil was deeply concerned by the tendency to promote an underlying narrative that opposed disarmament and indirectly gave credence to the validity, questioned by several delegations, of the logic behind deterrence doctrines. The Treaty was not a treaty on deterrence; rather, it was based on the concept that nuclear weapons were dangerous and destabilizing. The dedication of individual paragraphs to the views of each nuclear-weapon State was a privilege not extended to non-nuclear-weapon States, and should be reconsidered. Risk reduction was not yet a consensus area for consideration at the 2020 Review Conference, as paragraph 29 implied. Moreover, the call on nuclear-weapon States to take risk reduction measures "where possible" suggested that States parties agreed there were areas where that was not possible. Credible verification and compliance mechanisms for nuclear disarmament could be considered an effective measure under article VI if they were implemented within a framework of legally binding disarmament obligations and commitments.

80. The reference to "national security considerations" in paragraph 30 was unclear and inappropriate. The view that there was an urgent need to bring the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force should be attributable to States parties, as it was a sentiment shared by all. His country objected to the inference in paragraph 34 that only signatories and ratifying countries were obliged to uphold the norm established by that Treaty. The potential of a fissile material cut-off treaty to contribute to nuclear disarmament, encompassing existing stocks, should be mentioned in paragraph 35. The view set out in paragraph 37 that a moratorium on the production of fissile material was not clearly defined required further clarification.

81. Reference in paragraph 40 to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was inadequate. Several delegations had made extensive references to the Treaty, its content and relevance, and their statements must be accurately reflected. For example, Brazil could not "welcome" the presentation of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, as stated in paragraph 45, while merely "noting" the adoption of the aforementioned Treaty.

82. The primary responsibility of the Security Council in cases of non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty was shared with the General Assembly. The reference to such cases in paragraph 48 should therefore be either corrected, as per the language agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, or specifically linked to article X only.

83. The inaccurate inference in the final sentence of paragraph 53 that additional protocols, together with comprehensive safeguards agreements, represented a new verification standard under the Treaty was unacceptable. The final sentence of paragraph 84 might reflect the view of only one State party, and should therefore be adjusted accordingly. The strong support for the joint comprehensive plan of action referred to in paragraph 88 had in fact been overwhelming support, which had been not merely reiterated but expressed in relation to the current circumstances.

84. The final sentence of paragraph 93 unjustifiably made the right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes conditional on international cooperation agreements and arrangements. Lastly, Brazil opposed the more flexible approach to review conference outcome documents referred to in paragraph 114. His country would submit more extensive comments in a working paper.

85. **Ms. Castillo Castro** (Colombia) said that the current session had not only provided States parties with an opportunity to consider the progress made by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States

since the 2015 Review Conference, but had also increased their awareness of the challenges they would face in the two years remaining before the 2020 Review Conference. She hoped that more results, greater political will and more technical capacities could be reported in 2020. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only definitive guarantee against their use and the resulting catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would not only contribute to international security; disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology would promote sustainable development, benefit all States and improve international relations.

86. Nuclear arms, possession of which did not result in increased security, could not continue to be accorded such importance in the security doctrines of certain States. As the Chair's factual summary indicated, the existence of certain vulnerabilities, including vulnerability to cyberattacks, might lead to accidental or intentional detonation of a nuclear weapon. It was therefore too great a risk for States to continue maintaining their nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear-weapon States were making decisive progress on disarmament, negative security assurances, which must be universal, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, should be strengthened. For that reason, Colombia reaffirmed its intention to advance with negotiations on a relevant legally binding instrument. Similarly, her country hoped that tangible progress could be made in negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty before 2020. Both instruments would be undeniable proof of States' will to build a sustainable international security environment and make tangible progress on eliminating nuclear weapons. Colombia also welcomed the reference in the summary to the urgent need to bring the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force and joined calls for States that had not yet signed or ratified it to do so without delay.

87. Lastly, Colombia wished to reaffirm its commitment to the review process, and joined calls to appoint the President of the 2020 Review Conference promptly in order to ensure the continuity required for the success of the process.

88. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America) said that the current review cycle marked the golden anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a milestone that should prompt States parties to reflect on the Treaty's contribution to security and recommit to maintaining and strengthening it. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons remained the key benefit offered by the Treaty. His country welcomed the strong support expressed for additional protocols and would continue to work towards their universalization as the de facto safeguards standard under the Treaty. A strong and effective non-proliferation regime also built confidence that nuclear weapons programmes would not contribute to nuclear proliferation. That confidence, alongside high nuclear safety and security standards, would facilitate access to the diverse benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, science, and technology. His country looked forward to working with all States to expand those benefits.

89. The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a paramount global security issue. That country's recent declarations were encouraging, but the United States would await concrete actions on permanent, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. The continued success of the Treaty depended on States parties' constant vigilance in responding to such challenges. Any failure to address them would endanger the development and security benefits enjoyed by all under the Treaty. The actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were only one element of the overall deterioration in the global security environment that had made short-term prospects for progress on disarmament bleak. A return to more favourable conditions would require States to acknowledge the link between disarmament and the prevailing security environment, and the need for all States parties to work together on effective measures to establish the conditions that would enable further nuclear disarmament. The United States had consistently promoted that approach during the current session, as detailed in document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30, which it encouraged all States parties to review. A key aspect of the approach was the promotion of transparency. His country had demonstrated its commitment to transparency throughout the current session, including by hosting a side event on the United States Nuclear Posture Review, and commended the United Kingdom and France for being similarly transparent with regard to their nuclear policies. He encouraged other nuclear-weapon States to take action to demonstrate their commitment to transparency.

90. The United States remained committed to the long-term goal of a Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Its working paper (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33) offered constructive ideas grounded in political and security realities in the region. His country did not seek to impose preconditions or dictate the path ahead; rather, it invited dialogue with and among the States of the region regarding steps that could build trust and address underlying issues that had impeded progress. One such

highly relevant issue was the deplorable use of chemical weapons by one State against its own people, and its failure to comply with its safeguards obligations. Ultimately, the decision regarding how to proceed must be made by the States of the region and could not be imposed by outside parties. The United States stood ready to support any approach that had consensus support among all those States and was based on direct and inclusive dialogue.

91. His country appreciated the Chair's factual summary. The United States agreed with many of the views expressed therein, but disagreed with many others. Nevertheless, the text clearly reflected the fact that States parties were unified in their support for the Treaty as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, despite their differing views on how best to achieve the Treaty's goals.

92. **Mr. Hajnoczi** (Austria) said that several key points discussed at the current session were not fully reflected in the Chair's factual summary. For example, the sense of urgency to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation treaty should have been expressed more forcefully. Moreover, he had been surprised to read in paragraph 19 that "some" rather than "all" nuclear-weapon States' modernization programmes were inconsistent with their commitments under the Treaty. Unlike the factual summary of the Chair of the previous session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.40), there was no reference to States parties' increased understanding of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which had previously been underestimated. Those consequences went beyond national borders, and could threaten the very survival of humanity. Greater time should therefore be dedicated to discussing them in the context of the Treaty. Given the continuous global threat posed by nuclear weapons, it was the shared responsibility of all States to pursue nuclear disarmament efforts. Positions that had been expressed by a significant number of States parties, as was the case in relation to document NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.9, should have been reflected, particularly since the summary contained the comments of individual delegations.

93. The current session had reaffirmed States parties' shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Austria was one of many States to have highlighted that the continued possession of nuclear weapons fuelled proliferation; however, that fundamental point was not reflected in the text. Like many other States, Austria welcomed the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which contributed to the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and was encouraged by the broad support expressed for its adoption. Indeed, Palau had deposited its instrument of ratification the previous day, and his country would do so in the coming week. The fact that it had been welcomed, rather than merely noted, should have been adequately reflected in the summary.

94. Austria was also committed to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was indispensable for the full implementation of article VI. The discussions that had taken place regarding the Korean Peninsula had involved the repeated call on all countries that had not yet done so to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay or preconditions. In the meantime, existing moratoriums must be maintained; that point could have been more forcefully reflected in the summary. His country also welcomed the fact that the International Monitoring System was fully operational. The summary should have reflected the view of many delegations that security doctrines must not be based on nuclear deterrence.

95. **Mr. Gabriëlse** (Netherlands) said that the Chair's factual summary provided a fair, balanced and comprehensive overview of the issues that had been discussed. It would have been impossible to include every position expressed on such a wide range of issues. However, the text had captured the essence of their discussions. While it was clear that States parties' views differed on many issues, there had been constructive exchanges, and broad support had been expressed for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its central role in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On that basis, it was possible to further develop and implement the Treaty. That could be seen in the summary's forward-looking paragraphs on a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament verification and the need to further strengthen working methods. The summary could form the basis for further discussion and work as the 2020 Review Conference approached. The success of that Conference was vital. In that context, the Netherlands supported the document containing the Chair's reflections on the state of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12).

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.